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I. INTRODUCTION 
"You already have zero privacy-get over it," warned Scott 
McNealy, chief executive of Sun Microsystems at the launch of his 
company's Jini consumer networking software.l In fact, laws 
protecting privacy are everywhere in the United States. These 
privacy laws intersect with the Internet in more ways than even Mr. 
McNealy might imagine. The problem is that thinking about how 
United States privacy law interacts with the Internet can be 
perplexing. Just as the British poet, Stephen Spender wondered at 
"understanding the intersection of visible with invisible worlds," 
observers of privacy and the Internet can be bewildered by the 
complexity of the intersecting elements. Of course, unlike Spender's 
image, aspects of invisibility and visibility, concreteness and 
abstraction, are woven into both the Internet and privacy laws. 
The purpose of this essay is to consider some characteristics of 
t Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A. Wellesley College; J.D. 
Harvard Law School. This essay is based on remarks prepared for the symposium, Privacy in 
the Next Millennium, February 11-12,2000 at Santa Clara University. 
1. John Markoff, Growing Compatibility Issue: Computers and User Privacy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1999, at AI. 
357 
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United States privacy law that contribute to the obscurity of many 
intersections between the Internet and privacy law. This discussion is 
not an exhaustive catalogue of all of the ways in which United States 
privacy law may apply to Internet activities. Nor is it intended to be 
an evaluation of the effectiveness of this privacy law. Rather, the 
point here is to explore why the application of privacy law to the 
Internet is a matter of considerable complexity and some uncertainty. 
The focus is on certain characteristics of privacy law that can mislead 
even very smart people into believing that privacy is not here. 
Both the Internet and United States privacy law operate in varied 
ways across many dimensions. Just as the Internet is an 
interconnection of digital networks that operates in multiple ways to 
communicate data and other information worldwide, United States 
privacy law embraces many types of laws that protect and vindicate 
individual self-determination with regard to personal activities, 
private decisions, and personal information about an individual.2 
With regard to the Internet, a varied assortment of privacy laws 
function in different ways to protect and to vindicate individual 
control over personal activities, decisions, and information. The 
complexities of the potential interactions between privacy law and the 
Internet may be difficult to visualize. But it is a mistake to count 
privacy, and the laws which protect it, as zero. 
II. THREE CHARACTERISTICS OF UNITED STATES PRIVACY LAW 
Three main characteristics of United States privacy law help to 
explain why it can be difficult to understand how privacy law 
intersects with the Internet. First, United States privacy law is 
diverse. Second, United States privacy law is decentralized. Third, 
United States privacy law is dynamic. As privacy law has evolved 
over the past century or so, these characteristics have resulted in a 
myriad of specific privacy laws applicable in the United States. Only 
a few of the details of these privacy laws can be noted here. 
Consider an average Internet user, Irene.3 During a typical week, 
2. Warren & Brandeis fIrst described the right to privacy as a right to an "inviolate 
personality." See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. 
REV. 193, 205 (\890). The article argued that: ''The common law secures to each individual the 
right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be 
communicated to others . . .  fIx[ing] the limits of the publicity which shall be given to them." 
Id. at 198. 
3. See results of a recent study by the Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of 
Society. Norman H Nie & Lutz Erbing, Internet and Society: A Preliminary Report (visited 
Feb. 18, 2000) <http://www.stanford.edu/group/siqss>. The survey was based on a nationwide 
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Irene is on-line for five hours or so, reading and sending e-mail to 
friends and business associates, doing research and writing reports. 
Sometimes Irene participates in Internet auctions or purchases books 
or airline tickets from Internet companies. She subscribes to a couple 
of Usenet groups and occasionally visits chat rooms and on-line 
forums. Irene probably believes that her Internet activities are 
private. But she is most likely unaware of the multitude of privacy 
laws applicable to her activities on the Internet. Although these 
privacy laws may not perfectly protect Irene's on-line privacy,4 if 
Irene were aware of the many ways in which privacy laws affect her 
on-line, she would be amazed.s 
A. Diverse 
Understanding United States privacy law begins with the 
recognition that privacy law is not an "it." Instead, United States 
privacy law is a very diverse collection of many different types of 
privacy laws. The tendency of these privacy laws to focus on 
specific, even narrow, privacy concerns or contexts has generated 
widespread criticism of privacy laws in the United States as 
"piecemeal" or fragmented.6 A number of years ago a federal appeals 
court judge described United States privacy law as like a "haystack in 
a hurricane.,,7 In an opinion for the United States Supreme Court, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized privacy as "defying categorical 
description."s Even the distinguished privacy advocate, Arthur R. 
random sample of 4,113 individuals over the age of 18 in 2,689 households. Over a third (36%) 
of those responding reported being on-line at least fivc hours each week. Almost half of the 
respondents reported Internet use of between one and five hours per week. See John Markoff, A 
Newer, Lonelier Crowd Emerges in Internet Study, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2000, at Al fig. 
4. Indeed, aspects of privacy law may well be antiquated, out of sync with modem life, 
not to mention Internet technologies. Since most privacy law was not designed with the Internet 
in mind, loopholes and misfits are to be expected. However, privacy law's many imperfections 
are not the focus of this discussion. Rather the point here is to demonstrate that, although a 
great deal of privacy law does apply to Irene's on-line activities, understanding that privacy law 
can be difficult. 
5. Professor Lawrence Lessig has ably addressed different, but no less intriguing, issues 
regarding the architecture of the Internet and whether the Internet is being designed and built 
with acceptable respect for privacy values in mind. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). Chapter 11 discusses the value of privacy and the 
importance of building it into the architecture of the Internet See id. at 142-63. 
6. Almost every imaginable imagery of a heterogeneous mixture has been used to 
describe United States privacy law. Many of these metaphors seem to be based on food-from 
hodgepodge (stew) to succotash (mixed vegetables). 
7. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956), 
cert. denied 351 U.S. 926 (1956). 
8. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). 
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Miller, described United States privacy law as "a thing of threads and 
patches.,,9 And yet the very diversity that makes privacy law seem 
difficult to pin down also contributes to its vitality and makes its 
application to the Internet interesting. 
Three aspects of the diversity of United States privacy laws are 
particularly important: (i) the tendency of modern privacy law to 
divide into at least two main branches of privacy interests: privacy 
concerns about autonomy and privacy concerns about personal 
information; (li) the variety of different types of privacy laws; and 
(iii) the specific, context-dependent nature of many privacy laws. 
These characteristics of privacy law account for much of the internal 
diversity and complexity of United States privacy law. 
1. Autonomy and Personal Information 
As United States privacy law evolved over the past century, two 
general branches developed. These two branches reflect what are 
perceived to be different types of privacy concerns: On the one hand, 
privacy law is concerned about an individual's autonomous control 
over personal activities and decisions. On the other hand, privacy law 
is also concerned about an individual's control over personal 
information about that individual.1O For example, the California 
Supreme Court has described the guarantee of an "inalienable right to 
privacy" in the California constitution as divided into two separate 
areas of privacy interests: "(1) interests in precluding the 
dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information 
('informational privacy'); and (2) interests in making intimate 
personal decisions or conducting personal activities without 
observation, intrusion or interference ('autonomy privacy,).,,11 
Depending on the category into which a particular privacy case fits, a 
different privacy analysis applies. 
Although often treated as separate categories, autonomy privacy 
and informational privacy are in fact intimately intertwined, 
particularly when privacy law intersects with the Internet. For 
example, assume that our average Internet user, Irene, objects to 
9. ARTHURR. MILLER. 'fHE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 169 (1971). 
10. In Whalen v. Roe. 429 U.s. 589. 598-99 (1977). Justice Stevens noted that: "The cases 
sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact involved at least two different kinds 
of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and 
another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." 
11. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35, 865 P.2d 633, 654, 26 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 834, 856 (1994); see also discussion in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 16 
Cal. 4th 307. 332. 940 P.2d 797, 812. 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 225 (1997) (plurality opinion). 
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surreptitious electronic surveillance of her Internet activities through 
the collection of personal information about her on-line activities. 
Such an objection is partly classified as a concern about autonomy 
privacy-her ability to control her life and her choices about how to 
live that life. This privacy concern is about her "right to be let alone," 
frequently associated with the autonomy right to privacy.12 At the 
same time, Irene is also concerned about whether personal 
information about her is stored, manipulated, connected up with other 
information or disseminated to others. For example, Irene may well 
be concerned about a marketing company's collecting information 
about the web sites she visits, about the company's manipulating this 
information into an "Irene" on-line profile, about the company's 
connecting that profile with other information (such as her address 
and telephone number), and also about the company's selling the 
whole consumer picture of Irene to a marketing firm . These 
informational privacy concerns are, of course, interrelated with her 
autonomy privacy concerns. Internet users, such as Irene, object to 
collection of information about their on-line activities both because 
such surveillance interferes with their individual autonomy and 
because they have an informational privacy interest in controlling the 
use of such information. Nevertheless, United States privacy law 
often places these concerns in separate categories and applies 
different analysis to each of them. 
Because the Internet is an information network, most Internet 
observers look at Internet activities as involving primarily 
informational privacy concerns about controlling the collection, 
storage, manipulation, and dissemination of personal information. 
For example, Irene is concerned about unauthorized disclosure of her 
credit card numbers or her bank account balance. But such concerns 
are only part of the picture. In fact, for Irene and other Internet users, 
autonomy privacy interests in preventing the collection of such 
information in the first place may well be of even greater practical 
importance. After all, personal information that is not collected 
cannot be stored, manipulated or disclosed. 
Autonomy privacy interests are often associated with such issues 
as decisions regarding contraception13 and abortion.14 But autonomy 
12. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 195. The notion of a "right to be let alone" is 
usually attributed to Judge Thomas Cooley, who described it as "[t]he right to one's person may 
be said to be a right of complete immunity: the right to be let alone." THOMAS M. COOLEY, 
COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (1879). 
13. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
14. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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privacy also extends to an individual's self-determination regarding 
who will have how much access to that individual. IS In the Internet 
context, Irene's autonomy privacy concerns include her ability to 
control whether or not her purchases of various types of goods and 
services from Internet sites are compiled into her consumer profile, 
since that profile is likely to be a "stand-in" or alter-ego for her with 
regard to future transactions. Autonomy privacy concerns also arise 
when censors or snoopers interfere with Irene's choices to send and to 
receive information over the Internet.16 Surreptitious surveillance of 
Irene's Internet activities, for example through "cookies" or by 
creation of an on-line profile of her browsing habits, also raise 
autonomy concerns about her privacy on the Internet. Another 
example of autonomy privacy is Irene's choice to visit web sites 
anonymously. She might, for example, decide to participate in a 
Usenet group for expectant mothers under a pseudonym without 
revealing her actual identity. Irene might also choose to interact with 
the Internet through a persona or avatar. Her screen name might be 
"Inez" or "Ike" in a chat room, for example. Such autonomous self­
redefinition illustrates a slightly different, and controversial, form of 
autonomy privacy, sometimes called anonymityl7or pseudonymity. 
Although privacy tort actions have for a long time protected an 
individual's autonomy privacy right to self-definition and 
redefinition,18 the extent to which such autonomy privacy concerns 
15. The initial argument for recognizing a right of privacy in the United States defmed 
privacy as based on the principle of "an inviolate personality" associated with "the right to be let 
alone." Warren & Bmndeis, supra note 2, at 205; see also Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of 
the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1,21-28 (1979). 
16. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). In this case involving the seizure of 
obscene film from a person's home, Justice Marshall insisted that the 
Right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is 
fundamental to our free society .... [T]he right to be free, except in very limited 
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy . • . .  If 
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business 
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or mms he 
may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving 
government the power to control men's minds. 
[d. at 564-65. 
17. See generally Anne W. Bmnscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, Accountability: 
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE LJ. 1639 (1995). 
18. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). This damage action 
for invasion of privacy was brought in the 1930s by a reformed prostitute against film makers 
who made a movie, "The Red Kimono," in which they used both the facts of her former life as a 
prostitute and her maiden name. The court found that, having reformed and redefined herself as 
a respectable married woman, she had a recognizable cause of action based on "the right to live 
one's life in seclusion, without being subjected to unwarmnted and undesirable publicity. In 
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can or should be translated into privacy law applicable to the Internet 
remains controversial. 19 
2. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
Legal protections for both autonomy privacy interests and 
informational privacy interests often depend in part on whether 
expectations of privacy are considered reasonable in a particular 
setting.20 For example, legal protection for Irene's privacy is likely to 
depend in part on whether she reasonably expects privacy when she 
accesses the Internet. Since Internet users, such as Irene, would be 
reluctant to log onto the Internet if they could not reasonably expect at 
least some degree of privacy with regard to their on-line activities, 
they appear to have at least some reasonable expectation of privacy 
on the Internet. Assurances of privacy protection by e-commerce 
vendorl1 and Internet service providers22 demonstrate that the 
short, it is the right to be let alone." Id. at 289, 297 P. at 92 (1931). 
19. Objections to Internet-anonymity are typically based on concerns about the potential 
for untraceable criminal activity such as money laundering, misappropriation of intellectual 
property, or drug trafficking_ See United States Department of Justice, THE ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT INvOLVING THE USE OF THE lNTERNEf, 
(Mar. 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminaVcybercrime/unlawful.htm> (Report of the 
President's Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet). 
20. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz was a wiretapping case 
involving Fourth Amendment objections to interception of Katz's telephone calls from a public 
telephone booth. The majority opinion is famous for its ruling that the privacy protections in the 
Fourteenth Amendment protect "people and not simply 'areas.'" Id. at 353. Justice Harlan 
stated in his concurring opinion that whether there was a search for Fourth Amendment 
purposes depended on two factors, "first, whether the person involved exhibited an actual, 
subjective, expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'." Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
21. For example, American Express begins its Internet Privacy Statement with the 
assertion: "Protecting your privacy is important to us." American Express Customer Internet 
Privacy Statement (visited Apr. 2, 2000) 
<http://home3.americanexpress.com!corp/consumerinfo/privacy/privacystatemenlasp>. The 
"Lycos Privacy Policy" page features not only a statement about Lycos's SUbscription to the 
TRUSTe privacy protection program but also "Our Privacy Vow." See Lycos Privacy Page 
(visited Apr. 2, 2000) <http://www.lycos.com!privacy/>. Unfortunately the content of this 
"privacy vow" seems to have more to do with collecting information than with respecting 
privacy. The vow states: 
Id. 
Our goal at Lycos is to be 'Your Personal Internet Guide' by providing you with 
the information and services that are most relevant to you. To achieve this goal, 
we need to collect information to understand what differentiates you from each of 
our millions of other unique users. We collect this information in two ways. 
The bottom line of the Lycos Privacy Policy, its last element, is entitled "DeletelDelist," and 
states, "[ilt is not currently possible for a Lycos customer to delete his or her information from 
the database." Id. A personal request to be removed from the database will, however, be 
honored, according to the Lycos Privacy Policy. See id. 
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commercial side of the Internet recognizes that respect for privacy is a 
significant expectation of Internet users. 
Although the Internet may appear to some as a wide open and 
not very private environment, not every bit of digital data on the 
Internet is open to anyone who knows how to access it.23 For 
example, encryption, fire walls and other data security techniques can 
make certain Internet information inaccessible as a practical matter. 
Moreover, simply declaring the Internet non-private does not 
necessarily make it SO;24 nor does such a declaration eliminate 
reasonable privacy expectations on the part of Internet users. In 
reality, Internet users, such as Irene, reasonably expect some degree 
of privacy on the Internet, both because they are repeatedly assured 
that their privacy is being respected, and because privacy laws of 
many types protect and vindicate privacy rights with regard to both 
their autonomy and their control over personal information. 
3. Types of Privacy Laws 
Many types of privacy laws, both civil and criminal, protect and 
vindicate privacy interests in the United States. Although mostly 
developed before the Internet, these various types of privacy laws can 
apply to on-line activities of Internet users. A detailed descriptiori of 
all of these types of privacy laws is beyond the scope of this essay. 
But it is useful to highlight some of the major types including 
constitutional law, common law, statutory law, regulatory law, as well 
as self-regulatory measures. 
22. For example, see AOL's "Privacy Policy," which states "America Online, Inc. is 
strongly committed to protecting the privacy of consumers of its interactive products and 
services." AOLcom, Privacy Policy (visited Apr. 2, 2000) 
<http:\\www.aol.comJinfo/privacy.html>. 
23. Lawrence Lessig has argued that the Internet can and should be even better organized 
and constructed to respect privacy. See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 142-63 (discussing the issue of 
privacy in Chapter 11). 
24. The United States Supreme Court frowned on what the Court called "conditioning" 
expectations of privacy in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (finding no search when 
the government used a pen register to record numbers dialed from a telephone). In a footnote, 
the Court noted that the government cannot eliminate legitimate expectations of privacy by 
suddenly 
[A]nnounc[ing] on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be 
subject to warrantless entry [so that] individuals thereafter might not in fact 
entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and 
effects • . . .  In such circumstances, where an individual's subjective expectations 
had be 'conditioned' by [extraneous] influences . . .  a normative inquiry would be 
proper. 
[d. at 740 n.s. 
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As an example, consider the privacy laws applicable to 
electronic surveillance of Irene's Internet activities of the complex 
layers of different types of privacy laws. Irene is logged on to the 
Internet at home through a modem. Assume that Gill, a law 
enforcement officer, intercepts Irene's Internet communications, 
without a warrant or intercept order, and records Irene's e-mail 
messages and Internet transactions without her knowledge or consent. 
Gill's invasion of Irene's privacy is illegal under federal statutes 
prohibiting wiretapping without a warrant, as well as under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and other civil and 
criminal laws regulating electronic surveillance by government 
agencies and agents.25 Assume further that Paul, a private 
investigator, similarly taps and records Irene's on-line 
communications and transactions. Paul's invasion of Irene's Internet 
privacy would subject Paul to both civil and criminal penalties under 
different provisions of federal electronic surveillance statutes, as well 
as under privacy laws of most states.26 As will be discussed further 
with regard to the decentralized nature of privacy law, a combination 
of both federal and state privacy laws, including both civil and 
criminal statutes and state common law, would make electronic 
surveillance of Irene's Internet communications illegal on many 
levels. 
Of the various types of privacy laws, those relating to 
constitutional privacy rights are probably the most controversial.27 
According to Justice William O. Douglas's expansive view of 
constitutional rights to privacy, the penumbras of several provisions 
25. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 u.s.c. §§ 2701-2711 (1994); 
Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12 (1994); McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. 
Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998). Gill may also be in violation of state constitutional provisions and 
statutes. See, e.g., CAL CONST. art. 1, § 13; CAL PENAL CODE § 630 (West 1999). 
26. Federal statutes include the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2510-2522 (1994) and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994). An 
example of a state criminal statue penalizing wiretapping is CAL PENAL CODE § 631 (\Vest 
1999). The common law tort of intrusion, discussed infra at notes 36, 47-55, may also provide a 
basis for damage liability. 
27. The reasons for the controversial status of federal constitutional privacy rights are 
many. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Douglas's Right of Privacy: A Response to His Critics, in "HE 
SHALL NOT PASS TIns WAY AGAIN:" THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE Wn.UAM O. DOUGLAS 155 
(Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990). In the first place, the United States Constitution does not contain 
the word "privacy." Moreover, there is a broad range of many types of implicit constitutional 
privacy rights-from rights to receive information to rights to make decisions about procreation. 
Some of these privacy rights involve matters of deep-seated social and religious disagreement. 
For a critical discussion of Douglas' expansive view of the constitutional right of privacy see 
William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law 
Enforcement?, 23 U. KAN. L. REv. 21 (1974). 
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of Bill of Rights, including the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments, and the Fourteenth Amendment as it applies to the 
states, all protect privacy.28 These federal constitutional privacy rights 
are safeguarded against governmental action interfering with an 
individual's privacy. Most of them focus on the autonomy branch of 
privacy law. For example, Gill's warrantless electronic surveillance 
of Irene's Internet activities would violate her Fourth Amendment 
right against unreasonable searches.29 In addition, government 
interference with Irene's rights to unhindered communication with 
others, and against surveillance of her reading habits would most 
likely be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Regarding 
government collection of personal information about Irene's Internet 
activities and storing it in a database, the United States Supreme 
Court has suggested that, government mandated databases of personal 
information where the information is not lawfully collected nor 
adequately safeguarded, may violate federal constitutional privacy 
guarantees.30 
Most state constitutions contain search and seizure provisions 
similar to those in the federal constitution. 31 A few state constitutions 
also contain provisions explicitly protecting privacy. For example, 
the California Constitution expressly guarantees "an inalienable right 
to privacy."n Moreover, California's state constitutional privacy 
provision applies broadly to prohibit interference with privacy both 
by governmental and by private-sector invaders.33 
As a result, if Irene were on-line in California, her Internet 
activities would be protected under California's constitution against 
both misuse of personal information about her and interferences with 
her autonomy. This state constitutional privacy protection would 
apply to invasions of privacy both by government agents, such as 
28. See, e.g., Griswold v. State of Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding 
unconstitutional a Connecticut criminal statute which penalized the distribution of birth control 
infonnation or devices to married persons). 
29. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
30. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977). Justice Stevens' majority opinion 
included "[a] final word about issues we have not decided. We are not unaware of the threat to 
privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal infonnation in computerized 
data banks or other massive government files." [d. Cf. Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (concerning fonner president's constitutional privacy interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters). 
31. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
32. [d. § 1. 
33. See Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 
(1976). 
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Gill, and by private investigators, such as Paul. 
A second type of privacy law is part of the common law of torts. 
The origins of common law protection for privacy in the United 
States date back to a famous 1890 law review article, The Right to 
Privacy, largely written by Louis Brandeis, later a United States 
Supreme Court Justice.34 Almost all states now allow such damage 
actions for invasion of privacy. In fact, the common law of most 
states recognizes four different privacy torts. The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts Sections 652A-652I, adopted by the American 
Law Institute in 1977 provides a conventional description of the four 
• 35 pnvacy torts: 
Unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion (commonly referred to 
as "Intrusion"i6 
Appropriation of another's name or likeness (commonly 
referred to as "Appropriation"i7 
Unreasonable Publicity given to another's private life 
(commonly referred to as "Private Facts"iS 
Publicity unreasonably placing another person in a false light 
(commonly referred to as ''False Light"i9 
These four privacy torts are "personal" in the sense that only the 
living individual whose privacy has been invaded has the right to 
bring a lawsuit based on them.40 Privacy tort actions are also 
generally limited by absolute and conditional privileges similar to 
those applicable in defamation actions, such as consent and First 
Amendment protection for freedom of expression.41 In most cases 
involving these privacy torts, liability requires the privacy invasion to 
have been unreasonable. 
34. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2. The article described invasion of privacy as 
interference with an individual's "inviolate personality" and argued that the common law should 
allow damage actions to redress and punish invasions of privacy. See id. at 198, 205. See 
generally Glancy, supra note 15. 
35. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-I (1977). The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts [hereinafter "Restatement"] categories reflect an analysis of privacy cases by William 
Prosser, who was the Reporter for that Restatement. See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 
48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1 960). 
36. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
37. [d. § 652C. Sometimes this privacy tort is described as vindicating a right to 
pUblicity. 
38. [d. § 652D. 
39. [d. § 652E. 
40. See id. § 6521. In some states, statutes provide for the survival of privacy tort causes 
of action. See, e.g., CAL. CN. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2000). 
41. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTS §§ 652F-652G (1 977). 
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So far, only a few reported decisions have applied the 
Restatement's categories of common law privacy torts to the Internet, 
and only in regards to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.42 In the 
context of computer networks, reported decisions include Wood v. 
National Computer Systems, Inc.43 and Morrow v. II Morrow, Inc.44 In 
both of these cases, summary judgment for defendants was held 
appropriate because the allegedly privacy-invading material was not 
sufficiently published to the public at large, but rather was disclosed 
within a restricted network. Although distribution on a local area 
network (LAN) might not satisfy the "publication" required for 
liability under the privacy torts involving publicity, Internet 
distribution of information does seem to provide sufficient publicity 
for the appropriation, private facts and false light privacy torts. For 
example, in Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., the 
Federal District Court granted a preliminary injunction preventing an 
adult entertainment Internet content provider from distributing over 
the Internet a videotape of celebrity plaintiffs, Bret Michaels and 
Pamela Anderson Lee, engaged in sexual activity.45 
It is interesting to consider how each of the common law privacy 
torts might apply to an Internet user such as Irene, who is accessing 
the Internet from her home.46 For the purposes of the intrusion 
privacy tort, whether or not Irene can be said to have seclusion on the 
Internet depends in part on the extent to which the Internet can be 
considered a private place. Generally, the Restatement's concept of 
seclusion depends on whether a plaintiff s expectations of privacy are 
reasonable in that particular setting.47 Public opinion polls about 
privacy concerns with regard to Internet activities seem to suggest 
that at least some on-line activities, such as those involving healthcare 
information or personal financial information communicated in e-
42. See, e.g., Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472 ( lOth Cir. 1997); McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. 
Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998). 
43. 643 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (teacher's competency examination report 
mistakenly sent to another teacher did not constitute public disclosure of private facts). 
44. 139 Or. App. 212, 911 P.2d 964 ( Or. App. 1996) (false-light invasion of privacy 
action against employer who posted critical evaluation of employee on hard drive accessible 
company-wide was not established because employer did not distribute personal information to 
public generally). 
45. 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Although the preliminary injunction was based 
on both invasion of privacy and copyright infringement, the court specifically found that the 
plaintiffs were likely to prevail on privacy claims based on appropriation and pUblicity given to 
private life. See id. at 840. 
46. Different privacy law analysis would apply if Irene were on-line in her employer's 
offices. 
47. See discussion supra notes 20-24. 
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commerce transactions, are considered reasonably secluded.4S The 
commentary to Restatement Section 652B suggests that protected 
seclusion covers "private concerns" such as an individual's "private 
and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining his 
private bank account.', 49 It seems unlikely that the Internet venue for 
such matters as perstmal mail or personal bank account records would 
render such information any less secluded. The illustration to the 
Restatement section 652B that focuses on repeated annoying 
promotional telephone calls to a person's home despite repeated 
requests to desist seems to suggest that personally targeted "push" 
technology might constitute an unreasonable intrusion on seclusion.50 
Even if the Internet were considered a public place, the intrusion 
privacy tortSl may still apply in cases of intrusion into "a private 
seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairS."S2 
The comment to this part of the Restatement notes that: ''Even in a 
public place ... there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as 
his underwear or lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze; 
and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion 
upon these matters."S3 There are often issues regarding consent in 
intrusion cases.54 But the privacy tort that vindicates seclusion 
generally requires that the determination of the individual be 
respected with regard to matters that the particular individual 
'd alss cons! ers person . 
Irene's status as an Internet user does not affect her general 
privacy right to prevent having her name or likeness appropriated for 
the use or benefit of someone else.56 Most of the decisional law 
regarding tort liability for invasion of privacy by appropriation 
involves commercial use, such as advertising. When commercial use 
48. See, e.g., Mary J. Culnan, GEORGETOWN INTERNET PRIvACY POUCY STUDY: REpORT 
TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Mary J. Culnan, study director, 1999); Janlori Goldman 
et al., PRIVACY: REPORT ON THE PRIVACY POUCIES AND PRACTICES OF HEALTH WEB SITES 
(Feb. 2000) <http://ehealth.chcf.orglpriv_poI3rmdex_show.cfm?doc_id=333>. As noted, supra 
notes 21-22, privacy policies, vows and assurances by Internet companies reinforce expectations 
of seclusion. Images of locks visually enhance such an expectation of privacy. 
49. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977). 
50. [d. at illus. 5. 
51. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977) •• 
52. [d. at cmt. c. 
53. [d. 
54. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTS § 652F cmt. b. (1977). 
55. Cf. Massachusetts v. Source One Assoc., Inc., No. CIV.A.98-0507-H, 1999 WL 
975120 (Mass. Super. Oct 12, 1999) (unauthorized acquisition of personal financial 
information). 
56. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
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of a person's name or likeness takes place on-line, the liability 
analysis developed in cases involving other commercial media would 
apply. For example, using Irene's picture on BrowserCo's web site as 
the image of a "happy BrowserCo user" without her consent would 
probably be actionable. In addition, as commentary to the 
Restatement suggests, there may be liability for appropriation of 
Irene's personality even in the absence of commercial use "and even 
though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one.,,57 
According to the Restatement, passing oneself off as someone else or 
"otherwise seek[ing] to obtain for [one]self the values or benefits of 
the plaintiffs name or identity," is actionable.58 If another person uses 
Irene's identity to gain benefits, such as credit from an Internet 
retailer, or to gain access to valuable Internet services to which Irene 
is a subscriber, that person may be liable for invading Irene's privacy 
for appropriating her name or likeness. 
There are a number of unanswered questions regarding 
application of the appropriation privacy tort in the Internet context. 
For example, whether Irene's "personal image" in the form of her on­
line profile of browsing habits and purchasing patterns constitutes a 
likeness of her for the purposes of the appropriation privacy tort 
remains an open question.59 The privacy rights of an Internet user, 
such as Irene, to consent or not to consent to transfers of her on-line 
profile by Internet retailers or marketing firms is central to the debate 
over opt-in, as opposed to opt-out, consumer control over information 
reflecting a person's Internet use. Whether Internet users in the 
United States must be asked to consent to each appropriation of 
information about their on-line activities (opt-in) or, rather, whether 
Internet users have implicitly consented to general use of digitized 
profiles of their Internet activities so that each Internet user must 
expressly withdraw consent to sale of such information (opt-out), 
remains a very contentious privacy issue.60 In privacy tort cases, 
57. [d. at cm!. b. 
58. [d. at cm!. c. Whether it would be actionable under the common law appropriation 
privacy tort to use a famous, or infamous, screen name or Internet persona to advertise an 
Internet security service is an intriguing matter which has yet to be litigated. Logically if the 
name refers to an individual person, the common law tort should apply. Alternative grounds for 
liability in such cases might be based on copyright or trademarlc, if the persona or screen name 
were copyrighted or trademarked. 
59. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1 977). In this case the 
United States Supreme Court upheld privacy tort liability for appropriation despite First 
Amendment protection of freedom of expression, when a television station broadcasted the 
performer's entire act as a human cannon baH. [d. at 575. 
60. For example, Financial Services Legislation of 1 999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 502, 1 13 
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consent is often construed narrowly so that a deliberate decision to 
opt-in would ordinarily be required. 
Both private facts and false light privacy torts require publicity 
in the form of widespread dissemination that goes beyond mere 
"disclosure" or "publication" as these terms are understood in the law 
of defamation. With regard to pUblicity over the Internet, the 
Michaels case, supra, is an example of an actionable invasion of 
privacy for publicity regarding private facts over the Internet. Posting 
Irene's tax returns on an Internet bulletin board or surreptitiously 
web casting digital pictures of Irene privately celebrating a family 
birthday would probably also constitute tortious public disclosure of 
private facts, if done without her consent. If digital pictures of Irene's 
family celebration were accompanied by misleading references, such 
as to "the secret problem of inebriation at home," common law tort 
liability for false light invasion of privacy might arise. Even certain 
kinds of Internet spoofing by posting slanted information regarding an 
individual, for example by describing Irene, who is a gregarious 
person with a happy family and many friends, as a "lonely woman 
seeking affection on-line," might give rise to false light privacy tort 
1· b'l'ty 61 la 11 . 
Privacy statutes are even more numerous and varied than the 
common law privacy tort actions. Some state privacy statutes enact 
particular versions of the privacy torts. For example, in some states 
statutory rights of publicity authorize causes of action against 
exploitation of celebrity personalities.62 These statutory publicity 
rights are similar to privacy rights vindicated by the appropriation 
tort, but often provide more extensive privacy protection.63 Other 
statutes have enacted new forms of privacy rights against invasions of 
privacy, such as cyberstalking, that were arguably not actionable 
Stat. 1338, 1437 (Nov. 12, 1999) adopted an opt-out approach with regard to transfer of 
infonnation within a financial institution, but an opt-in approach with regard to disclosures 
outside of that financial institution. Given the conglomerate nature of many financial 
institutions, which may now include insurance, investments, credit reporting and other services 
under the 1999 Financial Services Legislation, the opt-out provisions applicable to transfers 
within a financial institution, may result in a much wider presumption of consent to transfer than 
is realistic. 
61. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974). Cj. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 
385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
62. See CAL. Cry. CODE § 3344 (West 1997). According to the Ninth Circuit, these 
statutory rights are in addition to the common law tort privacy rights. See Midler v. Ford Motor 
Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). 
63. See CAL. Cry. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2000) which provides for survival of the 
statutory publicity rights of deceased persons. 
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under the common law.64 Another example is California Civil Code 
section 1708.8(b), regarding constructive invasion of privacy, which 
penalizes use of visual or auditory devices to capture images of 
personal or familial activities.65 Many privacy statutes focus on 
particular types of information, such as consumer credit records 
protected under the Fair Credit Reporting Act,66 or Drivers License 
Records,67 or on particular databases, such as federal agencies' 
systems of records containing personal information, protected under 
the Federal Privacy Act.6S These privacy statutes are not specifically 
directed at Internet activities, but rather would apply to the Internet 
when the specified personal information or privacy invading conduct 
occurs on the Internet. 
A few statutes target Internet invasions of privacy. For example, 
the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act(f) is directed at 
protecting the privacy rights of children who access the Internet. This 
statute would protect the privacy of Irene's eight and ten-year old 
children, James and Jennifer, who are each on-line about an hour a 
day. Another example of a type of state statute directed at Internet 
invasions of privacy is the cyberstalking statute such as California's 
amendments to its anti-stalking statute noted above.70 If Irene were 
on-line in California, for example, the cyberstalking statute would 
make it illegal for someone to follow her about by shadowing her 
activities on the web and sending her threatening e-mail messages. 
In addition to privacy statutes, privacy laws also include agency 
64. See CAL. ClV. CODE § 1708.7 (West 2000) (establishing liability for stalking, 
including threats communicated by means of electronic communication devices). 
Id. 
65. Id. § 1708.8(b). This statute states: 
A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the defendant 
attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person, any type 
of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff 
engaging in a personal or familial activity under circumstances in which the 
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, through the use of a visual or 
auditory enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if 
this image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not have been 
achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory enhancing device was 
used. 
66. 15 u.s.C. §§ 1681-168 l t  (1994); see also In re TransUnion Corp., No. 9255 (FTC 
Mar. 29. 2000) < http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/transunionrestay.htm>. 
67. The Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U. S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994); see also Reno 
v. Condon. 120 S. Ct. 666 (2000) (upholding the Act's validity). 
68. 5 U. S.C. § 552a (1994). 
69. 15 U. S.C.A. §§ 6501-6506 (West 1999). 
70. See CAL. ClY. CODE § 1708.7 (West 2000). 
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regulations that provide privacy protection.71 For example, each 
federal agency subject to the Federal Privacy Act is required to 
publish regulations with regard to the nature of that agency's systems 
of records containing personal information about individuals.72 These 
Privacy Act regulations provide Irene both a way to discover which 
federal agencies maintain databases containing personal information 
about her and a process for accessing that information.73 Other 
examples of regulatory privacy law affecting the Internet are the 
Federal Trade Commission's proposed regulations implementing the 
Children's Online Privacy Protection Ad4 and the Department of 
Health and Human Services proposed regulations regarding medical 
records.7s 
In addition to constitutional, common law, statutory and 
regulatory privacy laws, non-governmental self-regulatory measures 
can also be the bases for legal privacy rights for Internet users such as 
Irene. Theses self-regulatory measures commonly take the form of a 
company's own privacy principles. Sometimes companies adopt 
codes of fair information practices put forward by trade associations. 
For example, Irene might encounter Amazon.com's privacy 
principles76 or those of American Express77 when she buys books or 
airline tickets over the Internet. These on-line privacy measures may 
be given legal effect to the extent that non-compliance would 
constitute a deceptive trade practice. For example, Internet retailers 
often make privacy promises to induce customers, such as Irene, to 
engage in electronic commerce with these companies. If an Internet 
retailer promises not to disclose Irene's Internet purchasing records to 
any other company, and then turns around and sells Irene's 
purchasing history to a direct marketing firm, the Internet retailer may 
be liable under deceptive trade practices laws. The Federal Trade 
Commission has taken unfair trade practices actions against 
companies that have announced privacy principles to attract 
71. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 99.1-.67 (2000) (Department of Education regulations 
implementing the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g 
(1994» . 
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4), (f) (1994). 
73. Id. at (d). 
74. See Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59888 (1999) (to be 
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt 312) (proposed Apr. 27, 1999). 
75. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 
59918 (1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160-64) (proposed Nov. 3, 1999). 
76. See Amazon.com: Your Privacy (visited Mar. 5, 2000) 
<http://www.amazon.comJexec/obidos/substlmisc/policy/privacy.htmll>. 
77. See American Express Customer Internet Privacy Statement, supra note 21. 
HeinOnline -- 16 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J.  374 2000
374 COMPUTER HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vo1.16 
customers, but then failed to abide by their avowed privacy protection 
promises.7s Such enforcement under deceptive trade practices laws 
means that if Internet companies falsely represent to Irene that they 
will protect her privacy, they may face potential legal liability for 
interfering with the privacy protection promised in gaining her 
business. 
4. Context-dependent 
Particular on-the-web applications of privacy laws frequently 
depend on the contexts of alleged invasions of privacy. This context­
dependency is at least partly explained by the way privacy law has 
evolved over the past century or so, often in reaction to particular 
invasions of privacy. For example, when Brandeis first argued that 
the common law should recognize a damage action for invasion of 
privacy, he pointed to the notorious case of Marion Manola, an 
actress photographed in tights against her Will.79 More recently, the 
use of motor vehicle license records by murderers of young women 
has led to the enactment of statutes restricting the availability of such 
records. so Although a few privacy laws apply broadly to a general 
form of invasion of privacy, such as electronic surveillance,sl privacy 
laws typically focus on a particular situation or type of personal 
information. For example, the federal Video Privacy Protection Act 
provides for the privacy protection of video rental records.51 This 
statute was enacted into federal law after the records of Judge Robert 
Bork's videotape rentals surfaced in Senate hearings regarding his 
nomination to the United States Supreme Court.83 Because privacy 
law has characteristically evolved by solving a particular type of 
78. See III re Geocities, Inc., No. C-3849, 1999 FTC LEXIS 17 (FTC Feb. 5, 1999) 
(ordering Geocities to cease deceptive trade practices in the form of misrepresentations 
regarding the use and collection of personal information). 
79. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 195. The lawsuit, Manola v. Stevens & 
Meyers, is discussed in Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy and the Other Miss M, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 
401, 402-19 (1990). 
80. The Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994), was prompted 
by the 1989 murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, star of the hit television series, "My Sister 
Sam." See 139 CONGo REC. S15745-01, *515762 (1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer); see also 
Ellen Barry, Killer's Dreams Bared on the Internet N.H. Man Took to Web to Boast and To 
Stalk, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1999, at B l ;  Killer Plotted Murder Through Internet, S.F. 
CHRON., Nov. 30, 1999, at A12. 
81. See discussion supra notes 26-27. 
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994). 
83. See S. REP. No. 100-599, at 5-6 (1988); see also House OKs Video Privacy Protection 
Bill, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1988, at 12; ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK 
NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA 274 (1989). 
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privacy problem or by reacting to a notorious invasion of privacy, or 
by protecting a particular type of personal information, it is not 
surprising that context plays an important role in the diversity of 
privacy law. 
For the most part, the privacy laws applicable to Irene's on-line 
activities were not designed for the Internet context, but rather can be 
applied to her Internet activities by extrapolation from other settings. 
In considering extrapolation of privacy laws to the Internet, two 
contextual factors are particularly noteworthy. First, different privacy 
laws will apply depending on whether the invasion of privacy 
involves collection of personal information or manipulation of 
personal information or dissemination of personal information. 
Second, different privacy laws will apply depending on whether 
privacy is invaded by the government or by the private sector. 
Some privacy laws concentrate on controlling collection of 
personal information. For example, the constitution and federal 
statutes restrict unauthorized electronic surveillance of Irene's on-line 
activities without a warrant or intercept order.84 The intrusion privacy 
tort also provides a basis for imposing liability for improper collection 
of such personal information. And yet the collection of information 
about Irene's Internet browsing remains controversial. Marketing 
companies maintain that placing cookies in Irene's browser or 
identification numbers in her microprocessor has nothing to do with 
Irene's privacy, because the information collected does not personally 
identify Irene. Rather, the information collected only identifies 
hardware or software, not any identified person who may be 
manipulating the hardware or software. The potential that records of 
Internet activities can be combined with other information to identify 
Irene as the user of the identified microprocessor or software cookie 
has, however, raised serious privacy concerns.85 Whether such 
information is personal to Irene at the time it is collected, or only 
potentially personally identifiable after it is connected to other 
information, is among the privacy questions posed by the nearly 
infinitely replicable, manipulable and aggregateable qualities of 
84. See discussion supra notes 25-26; see also supra notes 82-83. 
85. For example, plans by DoubleClick to integrate its web-browsing records with the 
consumer database of Abacus, a direct marketing company acquired by DoubleClick raised a 
storm of protest, fIrst from privacy advocates and later from Wall Street See Jeri Clausing, 
Privacy Adovcates Fault New DoubleClick Service, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2000, at C2; Privacy 
on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000, at A26; Bob Tedeschi, In a Shift, DoubleClick Pitts 
Off Its Plan for Wider Use of the Personal Data of Internet Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 
2000, at C5. 
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digitized information. What is certain is that the Internet's global 
network magnifies the consequences for individual privacy when a 
vast range of such digitized information is collected about people and 
their on-line activities. 
With regard to aggregation of personal information, the 1999 
Financial Services Legislation permits considerable manipUlation and 
aggregation of personal information within a financial institution.86 
As financial institutions become global providers of insurance, stock­
trading, savings accounts and direct marketing, in addition to retail 
banking, there will be enhanced opportunities for widespread sharing 
and manipulation of personal data among the many subsidiaries and 
afflliates of modern financial institutions. It is interesting to contrast 
this permissive approach in the financial services legislation, allowing 
widespread sharing of personal information about customers within a 
financial institution, with the approach in the Privacy Act, which 
restricts the transfer of an individual's personal information among 
federal agencies.87 
When dissemination of personal information is the context of 
privacy concerns, different privacy laws apply. Examples include the 
privacy torts of appropriation, private facts and false light as well as 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Different approaches to legal 
protection against improper dissemination of personal information are 
characteristic of these privacy laws. For example, the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act prohibits dissemination of Irene's credit history 
without her consent for all but a few restricted purposes.88 The 
disclosure of private facts privacy tort, on the other hand, provides a 
basis for Irene to bring suit for damages against an Internet company 
from which she purchased exotic lingerie, if that company were to 
publicly post the details of her purchases on its web site.89 
Another contextual factor that causes different privacy laws to 
apply is whether interference with privacy has been perpetrated by the 
government or by the private sector. It is interesting to note that 
Brandeis's initial discussion of privacy law was focused on non­
governmental interferences with privacy, mostly by newspapers.90 
Later, Brandeis came to see government as posing an even greater 
86. See Financial Services Legislation of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 502, 113 Stat 
1338, 1437 (Nov. 12, 1999). 
87. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994). 
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b-1681c (1994). 
89. See discussion supra notes 38, 45. Common law tort liability is also possible under 
appropriation and false light privacy theories for Internet postings of personal information. 
90. See Glancy, supra note 15, at 8-17. I 
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danger to individual privacy: 
The progress of science in furnishing the government with means 
of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping . . . .  Our 
government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for 
ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is 
contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds 
contempt for law; . . . .  To declare that the government may 
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private 
criminal would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious 
doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.91 
377 
Justice William o. Douglas agreed with Brandeis that the 
government' s threat to privacy was much more serious than that 
posed by the private sector.92 
Although concerns about government interference with privacy 
remain important, 93 at the turn of the twenty-first century, the focus of 
privacy concerns seems to have turned increasingly toward worries 
about invasion of privacy by private-sector hackers and crackers and 
telemarketers. Thomas Friedman calls this the "little brother" 
problem,94 as distinguished from the problem of omnipresent 
government surveillance symbolized by ''Big Brother" in George 
Orwell' s novel, 1984.95 Internet users seem to be particularly 
concerned about private-sector collectors, manipulators and sellers of 
personal information in what is now a globalized marketplace. 
Privacy law has always been responsive when new threats to privacy 
are identified. The focus of primary concerns about government 
invasions of privacy, such as those associated with Watergate, seem 
to shifting toward enhanced concern about invasions of privacy by the 
private sector, such as those associated with disclosures of credit card 
numbers from Internet sites. Underlying concerns about protecting 
individual privacy from being overwhelmed by society, whether in 
the form of big government or in the form of big business, remains a 
strong force in American law. 
91 . Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Eventually the United States Supreme Court agreed with Brandeis and reversed Olmstead. See 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1 967). 
92. See WIllIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHI' OF THE PEOPLE 123-24 (1 958); see also 
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 335 (1 971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Dorothy J. Glancy, 
Getting Government Of  the Backs of People, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1047, 1 050-51 (1981). 
93. See The Searchable Soul, HARPER'S MAG., Jan. 1 , 2000, at 57. 
94. See Thomas L. Friedman, Little Brother, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, Sec. 4 at 1 7; 
Thomas L. Friedman, The Hackers' Lessons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2000, at A31. 
95. GEORGE ORWELL, 1 984 (1 950). 
HeinOnline -- 16 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J.  378 2000
378 COMPUTER HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAWJOURNAL [Vo1. 16 
B. Decentralized 
The decentralized nature of United States privacy law further 
complicates understanding the intersections of privacy law with the 
Internet. There are not only diverse types of privacy laws operating 
in many different contexts, but also many different sources of these 
laws. Federal law and state law provide the two primary sources of 
privacy law in the United States. In addition, as noted earlier, 
sometimes these state and federal privacy laws interact with private­
sector representations regarding privacy policies and industry privacy 
standards. As a result, if Internet users such as Irene were suddenly to 
see the operation of the privacy laws potentially applicable to their 
Internet activities, they would see these privacy laws coming from 
several directions at once. 
The decentralized pattern of United States privacy law is in 
marked contrast to the more centralized approach taken in Europe, 
associated with the 1995 European Union Data Protection Directive.96 
The overall purpose of the European Data Protection Directive is to 
harmonize within the European Union the law which applies to 
processing personal information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person97 Under the Data Protection Directive, 
every member state in the European Union is required to adopt strict 
privacy laws providing privacy rights at minimum levels described in 
the directive. Such a centralized ''harmonization'' contrasts with the 
deliberately decentralized "cacophony" of United States privacy law.98 
Federalism is the primary reason why United States privacy law 
has generally avoided the centralized one-size-fits-all approach 
exemplified by the European Data Protection Directive. Indeed, 
reflecting federalism, United States privacy law mixes both federal 
and state laws, and also accommodates a divergent pattern of state 
privacy laws that often vary considerably from state to state. In 
another context, Justice Brandeis insisted that it is important for states 
96. See DIRECI1VE 95/46IEC OF THE EUROPEAN P ARUAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 24 
OCTOBER 1995 ON THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO THE PROCESSING OF 
PERSONAL DATA AND ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF SUCH DATA (October 24, 1995) 
<http://europa.eu.intleur-1exlenlIifldatl1995/en_395L0046.html>. Effective October 25, 1998, 
the Directive is subject to continuing refinement. 
97. See id. at arts. 2-3. 
98. The European Data Protection Directive can have practical consequences with regard 
to Internet activities involving personal information if these activities take place in part in 
Europe. Difficult and still unresolved, issues with regard to jurisdiction over Internet activities 
to make it hard to predict which nation's privacy law will apply in any given circumstance 
involving transnational flows of personally identifiable data. 
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to be able to experiment with social and economic legislation. He 
noted that "it is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a 
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments.'� 
Although Brandeis was not discussing privacy law in New State Ice 
Co. v. Liebmann, one of the most interesting social and economic 
areas in which extensive experimentation has taken place across the 
states, as well as between the states and the federal government, is 
with regard to privacy laws. 
A good example of the decentralized pattern of federal and state 
privacy law is the complex layering of federal and state privacy laws 
regarding electronic surveillance discussed earlier in this essay. 100 
Initially based primarily on federal constitutional and statutory law, 
these electronic surveillance laws now include the variety of both 
state and federal privacy laws that are applicable to electronic 
surveillance of Internet communications. Consider how both federal 
and state laws protect the privacy of Irene's Internet communications. 
Recall that Gill is a federal law enforcement official who has tapped 
Irene's modem line to intercept her Internet communications without 
a warrant or intercept order and that Gill's invasion of Irene's privacy 
is illegal under federal law. 101 Recall also that interception of Irene's 
Internet communications by a private investigator, Paul, would violate 
different provisions of federal wiretap statutes, as well as provisions 
of state law in most states.102 However, in some states, such non­
governmental recording of Irene's Internet communications through 
use of an extension telephone on Irene's modem line would be illegal; 
but in many other states such interception would not be considered an 
invasion of privacy. For example, if Irene were on-line in California, 
use of the extension line would violate California's highly restrictive 
electronic surveillance laws.103 But if Irene were on-line in New 
99. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26. 
101. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2701-2711 (1994); Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa to 2000aa-12 (1994); McVeigh 
v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998). If Gill were a state law enforcement official, he 
might also be in violation of state constitutional provisions and statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. 
art. 1, § 13; CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (West 1999). 
102. See, e.g., Biton v. Menda, 796 F. Supp. 631 (D.P.R. 1992). The Federal Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (1994), does not preempt state statutes 
which provide more protection to the privacy of electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 
2516(2) (1994). 
103. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1; CAL. PENAL CODE § 630-37.2 (West 1999); Ribas v. 
Clark, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 696 P.2d 637, 212 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1985). 
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Hampshire, that state's more permissive electronic eavesdropping 
laws would permit use of the extension telephone line to record 
Irene's Internet transmissions.104 
Although, privacy protection in the United States typically 
comes from a mixture of federal and state privacy laws, an 
interesting, and rare, exception to the decentralized pattern of federal 
and state privacy laws is the law that applies to the privacy of 
consumer credit records under the Federal Fair Credit Reporting 
Act. lOS With certain limited exceptions, only federal law applies with 
regard to matters covered by the Fair Credit Reporting Act.106 Aside 
from the Fair Credit Reporting Act, state privacy laws are generally 
not preempted by federal law. For example, the 1999 Financial 
Services Legislation expressly allows states to adopt more stringent 
privacy protections.107 So far, Internet users have not expressed 
interest in a unified federal privacy law that would preempt state 
experimentation with divergent approaches to privacy protection. 
Rather, Brandeis's notion of benign variation among state privacy 
laws, as well as between federal privacy laws and state privacy law 
seems likely to continue to be the preferred pattern of privacy laws in 
the United States. 
C. Dynamic 
Compounding the diversity and decentralization of United States 
privacy laws, is the remarkable dynamism of privacy law in the 
United States. From its inception in the nineteenth century, privacy 
law has evolved in response to new challenges to the privacy interests 
of individuals, particularly challenges posed by new technologies. 
This dynamic quality of privacy law is evident as old privacy laws 
confront new challenges posed by the Internet. Indeed, part of the 
original argument for recognition of the right to privacy in the United 
States was based on the need to respond to societal and technological 
change: 
Political, social and economic changes entail the recognition of 
new rights . . .  Recent inventions and business methods call 
attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of 
the person and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley 
104. See State v. Telles, 139 N.H. 344, 653 A.2d 554 (1995). 
105, 15 U.S.C. § 1681-168lt (1994). 
106. [d. 
107. See Financial Services Legislation of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 507(b), 1 13 Stal 
1338. 1442 (Nov.l2, 1999). 
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calls the right 'to be let alone.' Instantaneous photographs and 
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private 
and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to 
make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall 
be proclaimed from the house-tops. ,108 
381 
Among the privacy threatening technologies that worried Warren 
and Brandeis 1890 were the flash camera, plate glass, the telephone 
and telegraph.109 Later, in his famous dissenting opinion in Olmstead, 
Brandeis expressed concern that "Discovery and invention have made 
it possible for the government by means far more effective than 
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is 
whispered in the closet."l1o He speculated that 
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means 
of espionage is not likely to stop with wire tapping. Ways may 
some day be developed by which the Government, without 
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, 
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most 
intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic and 
related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, 
thoughts and emotions.111 
Had Brandeis imagined the Internet, he most likely would have 
predicted, and urged, further development of privacy law. 
Contemporary society's voyeuristic interest in prying into the 
details of personal life, evident in such aspects of popular culture as 
talk radio and shock broadcasting,112 pose a counter force against 
development of laws more protective of privacy.1I3 Internet 
web casting of activities including sexual intercourse, childbirth, 
working on homework and all sorts of other ordinary life activities, 
from the trivial to the profane, brings private life onto the web-on 
web cam, on-line, available virtually all of the time. Such challenges 
to privacy are not new. Even in 1890, Warren and Brandeis 
expressed outrage over the destructive impact of widespread 
1 08. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 1 93, 1 95. 
1 09. See Glancy, supra note 15, at 8. 
1 1 0. Olmstead v. United States (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928). 
l l I. [d. at 474. 
l l2. Typical examples are television's "The Jerry Springer Show," the film, "The Truman 
Show" and "Big Brother," which broadcasts the real lives of individuals over television in 
Holland and Germany. 
1 1 3. Judge Richard Posner has described this voyeurism as the interest in prying, which 
weighs against the interest in privacy. See Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. 
REv. 393, 394-97 (1 978). 
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publication of the details of private life: ''To satisfy a prurient taste 
the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of 
the daily papers.,,114 The Internet's proven capacity for even wider 
circulation of ever more personal and private information would 
undoubtedly have greatly troubled Warren and Brandeis, who counted 
the devaluation of private life through widespread disclosure as 
among the important policy reasons for legally protecting the right to 
privacy. 
As the Internet itself rapidly evolves, new privacy challenges are 
certain. For example, a recent research report predicts that there will 
be more than 1 .4 billion Internet participants world-wide by 2004.lIS 
What is perhaps even more remarkable is that the report predicts that 
by 2004 a majority of Internet participants will access the Internet 
over mobile terminals-both handheld and in vehicles. An estimated 
670 million people will access the web through fixed or "wired" 
platforms. But 750 million people will access the web over wireless 
modems, PDAs such as Palm Pilots and Psions, and Internet access 
built into vehicles.116 The suggestion is that the World Wide Web 
may well be rapidly transforming into a Wireless World Wide Web. 
As this transformation in Internet usage takes place, new privacy law 
issues will undoubtedly arise. These new privacy law issues not only 
include intensified privacy concerns with regard to the security of 
wireless Internet communications. They also will reflect privacy 
concerns about an individual's control over information that pinpoints 
an individual's geographical location as she accesses various sites on 
the Internet from changing locations. 
ill. CONCLUSION 
Despite Scott McNealy's pessimistic views, privacy is unlikely 
to wither away in the United States. If the past is any guide to the 
future of privacy law, the American public is unlikely to "get over" 
114. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196. The article decried the publication and 
circulation of personal infonnation as "potent for evil" and explained: 
[d. 
It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of 
things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people. When personal 
gossip attains the dignity of print and crowds the space available for matters of 
real interest to the community, what wonder that the ignorant and thoughtless 
mistake its relative importance. 
115. See THE ARC GROUP, WIRELESS INTERNET: ApPLICATIONS, 'TEcHNOLOGY & PLAYER 
SmATEGIES (1999). The contents of the report are also available at <http://www.the-arc­
group.comJreports!wireless_intemetltoc_ wilhtm>. 
11 6. See id. 
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privacy anytime soon. The privacy laws discussed in this essay 
already affect the Internet in remarkable ways. The future is likely to 
bring to bear even more privacy laws. These privacy laws may well 
remain invisible to most people. But there will be privacy laws 
intersecting with the Internet in more ways that even sophisticated 
Internet users may imagine. The wide spectrum of participants ill the 
February 2000 symposium on Privacy in the Next Millennium 
sponsored by the Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law 
Journal presented a clear demonstration that the interaction between 
privacy law and the Internet remains a matter of significant concern to 
those who think, write legislate and regulate about privacy in the 
twenty-first century. 
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